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Valuation of Intangible Property Before
Board of Tax Appeals
By James L. Dohr

Dealing as it does with a great many cases arising under the
revenue acts of 1917, 1918 and 1921, the United States board of
tax appeals faces many difficult questions in relation to the deter
mination of invested capital. Of these questions none is of
greater interest than the valuation of intangible property acquired
by corporations for stock or shares. Great numbers of corpora
tions are organized with a part, at least, of their stock issued for
intangible property, so that questions relating to the value of such
property must frequently arise. The bureau of internal revenue
seems to have adopted a policy of disallowing any such value in
invested capital except in the most convincing of cases, thereby
putting the taxpayer to his proof under more or less technical rules
of procedure before the board of tax appeals. During the first
year and a half of its existence the board has rendered numerous
decisions on this question.
The board has repeatedly declared that value is a question of
fact to be determined from all the surrounding circumstances
(appeal of General Lead Batteries Co., 2 B. T. A. 392; appeal
of Rock Spring Distilling Co., 2 B. T. A. 207), and that no hard
and fast rules can be laid down to cover all cases (appeal of
Gamon Meter Co., 2 B. T. A. 1124). Consideration has been
given to evidence of value in the form of expert testimony (appeal
of estate of Leon C. Riggs, 2 B. T. A. 668), a prior sale of the same
property (appeal of Johnstown Democrat Co., Inc., 2 B. T. A.
93), and most frequently, the earning power of such property
(appeal of Dwight and Lloyd Sintering Co., 1 B. T. A. 179). In
addition, the board would probably accept evidence in the form of
bona-fide cash offers for the property, the actual cash value of the
stock issued for such property (a possibility arising only infre
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quently), and appraisals, properly made, for purposes of estate
and transfer taxation. In any event the taxpayer must be pre
pared to show by competent and credible evidence all the sur
rounding facts and circumstances.
The board has also indicated a number of methods which will
not be accepted as establishing the value of intangible property.
Among these may be cited a mere book entry (appeal of White
House Milk Co., 2 B. T. A.), the value of stock issued for intangi
ble property as shown by selling prices two or three years later
(appeal of Richmond Dairy Lunch, 1 B. T. A. 876), gross earnings
of such intangible property (appeal of Wright’s Automatic
Tobacco Packing Machine Co., 1 B. T. A. 1260), the personal
qualifications of an individual (appeal of Providence Mill Supply
Co., 2 B. T. A. 791), and the par value of stock issued for such
property (appeal of Central Consumers Wine & Liquor Co., 1
B. T. A. 1190). Taxpayers have frequently attempted to estab
lish the value of intangible property by the last-named method,
i. e., the par value of stock issued therefor, relying on the statutory
presumption that capital stock is issued for value, and that, in
the absence of fraud, the judgment of the corporate directors as to
value for which stock is issued is conclusive (see, for instance,
section 69, New York stock corporation law). In the case last
cited, the board, in a carefully considered opinion, rejected such
method of valuation, holding that the use of the term “actual cash
value” in section 326 of the revenue act of 1918 indicated clearly
an intent on the part of congress to put the burden of proof upon
the taxpayer to show actual value. The use of the word “actual”
and the absence of a provision in the statute allowing intangible
property acquired for stock to be included in invested capital in an
amount equal to the par value of the stock issued therefor were
held to indicate clearly that no such method of valuation could be
used.
It is probably true, in a majority of cases at least, that the most
persuasive factor in the determination of intangible values is that
of earning power. Operation at a loss is almost conclusive evi
dence of the absence of such value (appeal of White House Milk
Co., 2 B. T. A.). Certainly in the cases of goodwill and patents,
which constitute the majority of instances of intangible property,
an evaluation in terms of dollars can be established, if at all, only
by reference to established earning power. Bona-fide offers are
seldom available and in the typical case the value of capital stock
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issued for goodwill or patents is as much a question as the value of
the intangibles themselves. Evidence may be introduced to show
favorable trade position, established clientele, cumulative ad
vertising value, aggressive sales methods, superiority of product
over competing lines, efficiency and economy in manufacturing
through patented devices, widely known trade names, etc., but in
the final analysis the value of goodwill and patents is dependent
upon their earning power. One turns instinctively to some
method of calculation whereby the value of intangibles may be
determined from their ability to earn or produce profits.
The use of earnings as a measure of the value of such an intangi
ble as goodwill has come to be a standard and established practice.
It is usually stated that there are three methods by which such
earnings may be so used, but on close analysis all three methods
appear to be identical. These methods are the following:
(a) The determination of the total value of an enterprise by
the process of capitalizing its total average annual earnings at an
appropriate rate and arriving at the value of its intangible prop
erty by subtracting the known value of its intangibles from the
total value so determined. This method is used, in part at least,
in exhibit C of the capital-stock-tax returns under section 700 of
the revenue act of 1924.
(b) The determination of the value of intangible property by
establishing a “purchase price” therefor equal to the average
annual earnings on such intangible property multiplied by a
certain number of years.
(c) The determination of the value of intangible property by
capitalizing the excess earnings over and above a fair return on
the tangible property. This method is the same as method (b)
above in that the rate of capitalization is designed to accomplish
the same result as the number of years’ purchase price used in the
preceding method.
The third method listed above is probably the one most com
monly used by those who face the problem of intangible-property
valuation. The board recognized this method in an early case
involving the value of certain license agreements acquired by the
taxpayer for the issuance of its capital stock (appeal of Dwight
and Lloyd Sintering Co., 1 B. T. A. 179). While it is not
at all certain, as will appear later, that the board would now use
this method in valuing such property as license agreements, it is
clear that it is well recognized as a method of evaluating goodwill
(appeal of Rock Spring Distilling Co., 2 B. T. A. 207). In the
83

The Journal of Accountancy

Dwight case cited above, the board, without explanation as to the
basic theory of such method, stated as follows:
The formula for determining the value of intangible assets by attributing
to tangible assets a certain percentage of return over a period of years and
capitalizing the balance on a reasonable percentage basis has long been
recognized.

In applying the capitalization-of-earnings method an exam
ination must be made of all the surrounding facts and circum
stances with a view to establishing the bases upon which such
method is to be attributed. Such bases include the following:
1. The average annual earnings of the company or its pred
ecessor in ownership prior to the valuation date. These should
usually be shown from the books of account and the taxpayer will
do well to show that such earnings are arrived at after adequate
provision for all expenses, including depreciation and reasonable
salaries for the administrative officers. A sufficient number of
years should be taken, usually not less than five, to obtain a fair
average, and the specific years taken should be such as to indicate
normal earning capacity. Extraordinary gains and losses, not
due to operation, should be eliminated.
2. The value of tangible property. In producing the earnings
included in the preceding paragraph, the usual situation is that in
which tangible and intangible property combine to produce the
earnings in question. As a basis for segregating the earnings
attributable to intangible property it is necessary in the first
instance to determine a reasonable profit for the tangible prop
erty. This profit is based upon the value of such tangible prop
erty.
3. Segregation of earnings as between tangible and intangible
property. The average annual earnings as determined above
must be segregated to show what portion thereof may be at
tributed to the tangible property and what portion to the intan
gible property. This is usually accomplished by assigning a
certain percentage of return to the tangible property. This rate
or percentage should be determined upon the basis of the sur
rounding circumstances, including the stability of the earnings,
the degree of risk or speculation involved in the particular in
dustry in question, the return required by investors on invest
ments in the particular kind of property involved, and the interest
rates on money. Basically the rate should be that which an
investor would require in order to pay par for stock issued for
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such tangible property, taking into consideration all of the fore
going circumstances. It is well known, for instance, that an
investor prefers earnings which are stable and unfluctuating to
higher earnings which are subject to wide variations. Stock in
an old and established corporation manufacturing commodities
in the nature of necessities will sell at a higher price, with given
earnings, than that of a new corporation manufacturing luxuries.
The price of stock will vary from time to time depending upon the
rate of return available on other types of investments. The
problem of selecting a proper rate of capitalization in this case is
identical with that which faces the investment banker in setting
a price on securities to be sold to the investing public.
4. The earnings attributable to intangible property. By sub
tracting from the total average earnings the fair return as estab
lished above on tangible property, the earnings attributable to
intangible property are determined.
5. Capitalization of earnings of intangible property. Follow
ing the establishment of the earnings attributable to intangible
property, such earnings should be capitalized at a percentage rate
in order to determine the value. The basic proposition involved
here is similar to that in relation with the establishment of a rate of
return on tangible property, namely, the rate of return which an
investor would require in order to pay par for stock issued for such
intangible property. Thus, if an investor would require an annual
return of 15% in order to pay par for stock in the amount of
$100,000 issued for goodwill, the actual earnings on such goodwill
should be capitalized at 15% (multiplied by 6⅔) in order to
determine the value of such goodwill.
In the Dwight case quoted above, the board established per
centages of eight and fifteen respectively on tangible and intan
gible property in order to determine the value of the latter. In
other cases percentages of ten and twenty respectively were used
(appeal of St. Louis Screw Co., 2 B. T. A. 649; appeal of
Hampton Co., 2 B. T. A. 302). The commissioner of internal
revenue has suggested the use of rates of ten and twenty per cent.
respectively (A. R. M. 34, CB 2, page 31).
Cases not infrequently arise in which no net earnings can be
shown for the intangible property prior to the valuation date. In
this situation the taxpayer urges that subsequent earnings on such
intangible property should be used. This situation was presented
to the board in an early case (appeal of [Saenger Amusement Co.,
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Inc., 1 B. T. A. 96), in which the board laid down the rule that only
the value existing at the time intangibles were paid in for stock or
shares could be included in invested capital, and that such value
should be determined only in the light of known facts existing at
that time, or on the basis of a reasonable and then-existing expec
tation of future earnings. The board refused to determine a value
on the basis of subsequent earnings alone, and has since that time
steadfastly refused to do so (appeal of W. H. Jackson Co.,
2B.T. A.411). This position of the board is undoubtedly sound,
and unless the taxpayer can show that the value of goodwill is
based on known facts at the time paid in, or was reasonably antic
ipated at such time, no value should be allowed. It is interesting
to point out that, whereas in a proper case subsequent earnings
may be used to corroborate or substantiate the value of goodwill
otherwise shown to exist, the taxpayer must not be unmindful of
the fact that subsequent earnings are equally corroborative as
proof that no goodwill existed (appeal of General Lead Batteries
Co., 2 B. T. A. 392; appeal of Wolcutt Bros. Co., 1 B. T. A.
910).
In the early history of the board, it appeared from its decisions
that this method of capitalizing excess earnings might be used in
establishing a value for patents as well as for goodwill. In the
Dwight case cited above the board in fact stated that such method
was equally applicable to patents. Since that time, however, the
board has indicated definitely that some modification of this
method of evaluation is necessary in the case of assets which have
a limited life (appeal of the General Equipment Co., 2 B. T. A.
840). In the first place, it becomes necessary in the case of
patents to show definitely the earnings attributable to such
assets (appeal of the Keller Mechanical Engineering Corporation,
1 B. T. A. 1183; appeal of Cheatam Electric Switching Device
Co., 1 B. T. A. 984). In addition to this, it seems that the tax
payer is required to show the remaining life of the patents in
order to determine the number of years over which such earnings
will flow (appeal of S. Marsh Young, 2 B. T. A. 457). If the
average annual earnings of the patents are shown and the remain
ing life is indicated as a certain number of years, it would seem at
first glance that the present value of the patents could be deter
mined on the basis of the present worth of an annuity in which the
interest rate would be made commensurate with the nature of the
business, risk involved, stability of earnings, etc. In several cases,
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however, the board has indicated that it prefers a method of cal
culation which has hitherto been used in the valuation of mines,
and is known as “Hoskold’s formula” (appeal of S. Marsh
Young, 2 B. T. A. 457; appeal of St. Louis Screw Co., 2 B. T. A.
649). Under this formula the value of patents is determined at a
sum of money which, if paid by a purchaser of such patents, will
permit such purchaser to secure from the annual earnings of the
patents a fair annual return upon his investment and in addition
provide an annual contribution to a sinking fund, which over the
life of the patents will accumulate in an amount equal to the pur
chase price. The following will indicate the computation under
this method:
Remaining life of patents at valuation date................
10 yrs.
Average annual earnings on patents............................. $ 10,000
Let X equal the value of the patents at the basic date.
$.08 X equals a fair annual return to the purchaser.
$10,000 minus $.08 X equals the balance of the annual earnings
available for contribution to a sinking fund.
$10,000 minus $.08 X accumulated annually at 4% will amount
in ten years to the purchase price.

Upon the basis of such a purchase price, the investor will
secure a fair annual return on his investment and, through the
operation of the sinking fund, will have his capital returned in
tact upon expiration of the patents.
Tables have been prepared to show the value of patents, when
the average annual return and unexpired life are known (see
Montgomery, Income-tax Procedure, page 717; also Skinner,
Mathematical Theory of Investment). These tables are usually
based on a 4% accumulation of the sinking fund and percentage
of annual return from 6% to 15%, the latter permitting a rate
selection commensurate with the nature of the patent risk in
volved, etc.
While the board has indicated that Hoskold’s formula is a
proper method for evaluating patents, it has also decided at least
one case in which the application of Hoskold’s formula was ig
nored and a higher value fixed (appeal of J. J. Grey, 2 B. T. A.
672). It is apparent upon some consideration that the operation
of Hoskold’s formula is not altogether satisfactory as a method of
valuing patents. Basically this formula is appropriate only in
the case of assets which have a definite life, and it is undoubtedly
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appropriate for mine-valuation purposes. When applied to
patents, it is to be noted that while in one sense of the word pat
ents do have a limited life, it is also obvious that the purchaser
of a patent takes into consideration other things than the earnings
of such patents and the remaining period of their existence. It is
a well known fact that the purchaser of a patent having a lifetime
of seventeen years often expects that before his patent has ex
pired he will have obtained improvements thereon by additional
patents which will have a practical effect of extending his monop
oly over a longer period of years. Further than this, it is also
well known that the purchaser of a patent, securing as he does a
monopoly for a period of seventeen years, usually expects that at
the end of the seventeen years he will have developed sufficient
goodwill and trade connections to enable him to continue profit
able operations. These facts have been recognized by the com
missioner of internal revenue in his regulations on the determi
nation of invested capital. In regulations 62, article 843, the
following statement appears:
From the standpoint of assets a patent, or more particularly a group of
patents, is closely analogous to goodwill. Their value is contingent upon
and measured by their earning power. While patents have a definite life,
there is a common tendency to extend that life by improvements upon the
original, and in a successful business the patent involved merges more or
less completely into a trade name or other form of goodwill.

This regulation indicates succinctly the limitations upon the
application of Hoskold’s formula in the evaluation of patents, and
while the formula will undoubtedly produce a fair result in some
cases it is not at all appropriate in situations where the patent is a
basic one, subject to improvements and likely to endure.
A survey of the board’s decisions to date indicates on the whole
that the board has established sound principles for the valuation
of intangible property. Where such value exists the presentation
of proper evidence by the taxpayer will result in a fair valuation
by the board. In the matter of proof the board has indicated
clearly and repeatedly the nature of the evidence acceptable and
required. If the taxpayer has acquired intangible property of
extremely doubtful value, he had best refrain from an appeal to
the board. Where the value is clear it behooves the taxpayer to
make proper and adequate proof under the rules. The decisions
indicate that the board is ready to do its part in the allowance of
such values where the evidence is convincing and properly pre
sented.
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